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Introduction
For the foreseeable future, there will be very few
activities or missions that will be accomplished
entirely by non-human, totally autonomous systems.
Human intelligence and the ability it confers to
exercise judgment and, thus, deal with unexpected
situations will warrant the services of human
members in future systems. The number of
autonomous systems working in conjunction with,
or in support of, human crews has been growing
rapidly and can be expected to grow at an even
faster rate in the future. We are faced with the
problem of designing systems in which a machine
intelligence and a human intelligence can work
together as partners. This may be more difficult
than designing a fully automatic, unmanned system.
Unfortunately, we have little appreciation of either
the potential or the limitations of close working
relationships between humans and intelligent
machines, or of how these interactions affect
relations with other crew members or total crew
performance.
The purpose of this paper is to call attention to some
of the issues confronting the designer of a system
that combines human and non-human intelligence.
We do not know how to design a non-human
intelligence in such a way that it will fit naturally
into a human organization. Our concern is that,
without adequate understanding and consideration
of the behavioral and psychological limitations and
requirements of the human member(s) of the
system, the introduction of artificial intelligence
(AI) subsystems can exacerbate operational
problems. We have seen that, when these
technologies are not properly applied, an overall
degradation of performance at the system level can
occur. Only by understanding how human and
automated systems work together can we be sure
that the problems introduced by automation are not
more serious than the problems solved.
Background
Our experience with automation in space is still
quite limited. However, there are examples from
aircraft operations to illustrate the point that the
implementation of engineering "solutions" may
prove inadequate when human behavior is
involved. A number of incidents (Connors 1989,
Wiener & Nagel 1988) have raised questions about
our ability to combine humans and automation into
effective teams. Although we will be referring here
primarily to examples from aircraft cockpits, the
problems of man-machine integration in complex
systems are ubiquitous. It is easy to strike out
"cockpit" and fill in "air traffic control center",
"submarine", "nuclear power plant", "launch
control center", "space station", or "Mars vehicle".
For many years, we have been able to rely on the
adaptability of the human to take maximum
advantage of each new technology. In the current
environments of data-display that missions have
required and computers have enabled, our man-
machine systems are capable of saturating the
human component with the sheer number of
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displays to be read, controls to be engaged, and
decisions to be made. Nevertheless, we continue to
depend on the human pilot to assess the situation
instantaneously, to make the "right" decision, and to
initiate the appropriate action. Many of us believe
that, in the realm of both military aircraft and space
systems, we are close to the practical limitations of
human sensory and cognitive capabilities.
For example, over the years, electro-mechanical
instruments, switches, and buttons have propagated
wildly in the cockpit, filling all the available space.
When the designer of the modern fighter aircraft
cockpit was faced with the dilemma of reduced
display space in the smaller cockpits along with the
need for still more information to be displayed to the
pilot, his solution was to replace task-specific
displays and controls with multi-purpose displays
and multi-function controls. Although this solution
addresses the narrowly-defined display problem, it
does not solve the operational problem, since
modern computers that are brought aboard to drive
these displays are capable of presenting far more
data than a human can possibly access and
assimilate in real time.
The F-18 aircraft has one of the more advanced
cockpits and is a good example of the problem of data
overload. This cockpit has three cathode-ray tubes
and a head-up display. There are 675 acronyms and
177 symbols that can appear in four different sizes
on any of the three cathode ray tubes. There are 73
threat, warning, and caution indicators, 59 indicator
lights, and 6 warning tones (no messages, just
tones), 10 multi-function switches on the throttle, 7
on the stick, 19 controls on the panel underneath
the head-up display, and 20 controls around the
periphery of each of the three cathode-ray tubes,
each of which has a multi-switch capability. Most of
the data displayed requires that the pilot's foveal
vision be engaged (while peripheral vision, utilized
in earlier displays, is largely ignored.) Every piece
of information that is available to the pilot for
multi-purpose display requires an additional control
to access that information. This imposes a memory
load on the crew who must remember how to access
the desired information and how to perform the
required control function. Often, these controls
must be found and actuated by touch while the pilot
is visually engaged elsewhere, sometimes during
moments of extreme physical and mental stress.
Since not all of the information about his aircraft
can be displayed to the pilot at all times, there has
evolved a proliferation of warning and alerting
systems. These systems remind pilots to take actions,
call attention to deviations from expected ranges,
suggest or demand an action, warn of unacceptable
configurations, and even take action on their own.
One of our favorite examples of where the
engineering solution to a problem seems to
disregard basic human-factors principles is the
helmet-mounted display for the US Army's attack
helicopter called the Apache. When a military
helicopter is operating nap of the earth at night or
in adverse weather, the pilot desperately needs help.
He must be able to see something of the outside
world. There is an infrared sensor, called a FLIR, in
the nose of the helicopter that provides a display in
the cockpit. There is also a computer on board that
generates symbologies both for flight-control
information and for weapons-control information.
There are 19 such symbols in three different
formats, depending on the flight phase. For the
pilot of this aircraft, all of this (the FLIR image with
superimposed flight- control symbologies and
weapon-control symbologies) is presented on a two
and a half centimeter monocle over his right eye.
At the same time, his left eye is expected to take care
of the contextual scene and the instrument panel.
We must also keep in mind that equipment intended
to enhance human capability can actually
encumber it by exacting a physiological toll that, in
turr], compromises performance. The tendency to
attach devices to the head is of particular concern,
often leading to a loss of head mobility and fatigue.
We have found some equipment of this type to cause
both physiological and psychological problems in
our military pilots. For example, some current
helmet-mounted displays provide different and
potentially disorienting visual images to the two
eyes.
613
The typical military or civil pilot today must
integrate enormous amounts of data from many
dissimilar sources, sometimes under great time
pressure. In our attempts to maximize the number
of physical channels available for transferring
these data, we have introduced voice and other aural
displays. However, the addition of secondary
modalities does not double the human's information
processing capability; indeed it may even impede it
by distracting the operator at a critical time. In
fact, the operator may not even be aware of
additional information because humans, under
certain conditions, tend to narrow their attention.
The problem may be further exacerbated by the
human tendency in stressful situations to see what
he expects to see and to hear what he expects to
hear. Both the civil and the military sectors provide
examples of where warning signals have been
ignored due to the human tendency, when under
stress, to selective attention.
The main point we wish to make is that humans,
although highly adaptable, are not unlimited in
their ability to accommodate to demanding task
environments. In some of our more complex
cockpits, the human may no longer be able to "take
up the slack". In addition, the electronic systems we
are now providing to aid the pilot ma_, not be
helping at all, and may actually be complicating his
job. He is confronted with too much data and in
formats that may not be conducive to rapid
interpretation. It is useless to continue providing
more data if the operator is unable to use it, since it
is relevant information, not data, that is needed if
the operator is to make good decisions.
In the past, when similar situations have been
encountered, we have typically solved the problem
by putting more men on the job. There are many
situations in which this solution is impractical, and
so it is tempting to look to artificial intelligence (AI)
as a way of augmenting human capabilities.
Presumably, with AI, one could fuse sensor outputs,
integrate data, present only what was needed when
it was needed, and assist the pilot in making
decisions.
In keeping with this view_ there have been
proposals for military aircraft with one human pilot
and several electronic crew members. Artificial
intelligence, decision-support systems, knowledge-
based systems, and expert systems became the buzz
words of the eighties. However, although there has
been a great deal of casual talk about the role that
machine intelligence might play, the problem of
developing the essential symbiotic relation between
human and non-human intelligence has been
examined only cursorily. We really do not
understand what it takes to satisfy human needs, and
it appears that even if we did, we do not yet know
how to build it.
The Problem
Knowledge-based and expert systems have found
some limited application in the control of physical
plants, manufacturing processes, and quality
control. However, they have yet to find a role in
circumstances that cannot be described with
mathematical algorithms or logical rules. But, not
all knowledge is susceptible to logic.
There exist many potential applications for
knowledge-based systems. Unfortunately, there are
several fundamental things that we still do not know
how to do. Following are just a few:
1. how to develop the complete knowledge
base (or even know when or if it is complete,)
particularly if it does not lend itself to logical rules;
2. how to have an expert system learn from
experience by changing its rules;
3. how to enable the system to make complex
decisions in real time during unexpected situations;
4. how to assure compatibility with the
human operator's perceptions of the situation and
acceptability by the operator of recommended
solutions; and
5. how to validate the "sanity" of the system.
As AI grows and progresses, we can expect some
advances in knowledge and understanding of these
areas. However, automated systems will remain
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limited by the assumptions that created them, i.e.,
they will always to "blind" to conditions that were
not explicitly or implicitly included in their design
(Winograd and Flores, 1987).
Also, while computers can, after a fashion, think
and learn, they do not think or learn as humans do.
Consequently, if computational systems should take
over decision-making chores, the human operator
may find himself at odds either with what the
computer is doing or the way in which it is doing it.
The rationale behind the introduction of automation
has been the desire to enhance total system
capabilities while maintaining operator workload at
acceptable levels, thereby minimizing the
possibility of human error. However, as more and
more physical control activities have been
successfully automated, they have been replaced by
mental activities on the part of the human operator.
Our experience with automation indicates that its
introduction usually relocates and changes the
nature and consequences of human error, rather
than removing it.
The negative reactions and incident reports that
NASA is beginning to receive regarding the
electronic crew member in the glass cockpit of our
modern civil transports support our concern. The
glass cockpit has been criticized for its failure to
reduce mental workload. Pilots believe that
automatic devices demand constant attention and
each device creates its own demands on the pilot's
time. Automation tends to isolate the flight crew
from the state of the aircraft and the modern pilot
can feel not only left out of the loop, but externally
controlled. Recent accidents suggest that excessive
automation tends to lower the level of vigilance of
human operators. Moreover, automation frequently
addresses short-term, subsystem solutions, rather
than total system performance. For instance, there
is often inadequate feedback and interaction with
the human controller (Norman 1990). Consider, for
example, the system that corrects for a fault without
notifying its human partner. In one incident, a
race car equipped with the latest automatic
compensation for brake failures suffered a failure
in one brake. The system automatically
compensated, just as it was designed to do. Shortly
after, a second brake failed, and, due to the
increased loading, the third-brake failure quickly
followed the second. But, the automatic
compensation system had done its job so well that it
was not until the fourth brake failed that the driver
realized he had a problem. This is an example of a
faulty design philosophy that has as its goal to show
the operator only what he needs to know when
(someone else determines) he needs to know it.
In an analogy with the artificial heart program, the
introduction of AI in a given system can fail (and
has failed) because we do not understand the
reaction mechanisms of the human. An AI
subsystem must be designed to sing and dance
gracefully with the human crew as well as with the
energy sources that power it and the environment
in which it must operate.
Therefore, the total system design must take into
account the capabilities, limitations, and needs of
the human component. We do this already with
respect to human physiological constraints, but now
we must take into account cognitive, motivational,
and other psychological needs. We will continue to
rely on the human in the vehicle for creativity and
innovation in coping with the unexpected. In our
future space systems, these humans will be better
trained and more knowledgeable than ever before;
but they remain humans whose tolerance for
vibration, heat, hypoxia, and G-forces has not
changed; whose visual perception and "information-
processing capacity are still limited; and whose
decision-making ability remains susceptible to
fatigue, illusions, biases and stress.
The design of the equipment intended to improve
total system performance must consider the full
impact it has on human behavior and on the
human's ability to perform the role expected of him.
This requires consideration of such things as the
effects on humans of being "in the loop" or "out of
the loop", the nature of trust between humans and
machines, the ability of the machine to
communicate the reasons for its actions to the
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satisfaction of the human operator, the ability of the
machine to respond to the human's "what if I did it
this way?" queries (Galdes and Smith, 1990) and the
fact that the human needs to feel that he or she is
ultimately in control. How can we be certain that
any data display will be clear and unambiguous in
all situations, so as to ensure the correct
interpretation by the human for fast and accurate
reaction in the rare critical situation? How do we
keep the human well informed without annoying
him? If the machine carries out all the routine
tasks, how is the human to be kept in a state of
alertness in which he or she is capable of
performing adequately if the machine should fail?
Many decisions regarding whether or not to
manually override an automatic system will need to
be made during critical phases of missions. Given
the demands of these phases, does the automated
system provide a net benefit to the crew? Can the
workload required of the human crew during these
periods be kept within acceptable limits?
Involving the human in the decision-making
process provides a essential layer of checks and
balances to make up for the shortcomings of the
non-human intelligence. However, there is no
point in extolling and relying on the real or
imagined virtues of human creativity and
innovation if the human doesn't know when to take
control, or if the system design is such that the
human is unable to be creative or innovative in the
actions which the system allows him to initiate.
Often the problem of the human-machine
interaction is considered to be merely one of
interface design. This viewpoint is a dangerous
oversimplification. It is like suggesting that human
communication can be explaini_d on the basis of
word recognition. System functionality depends on
characteristics of the communicating systems that
extend well beyond issues of the operator interface.
AI is going to be used to support dynamic interactive
tasks in which the human mind is an important and
active component of the total system. Designing
tools for this kind of complex cognitive-
psychological activity goes well beyond the issue of
display and control interfaces. It can no longer be
viewed as a process of designing a machine to do
something, and then designing the information
displays and controls which enable the operator to
guide the machine. A system's usability is
determined by the details of a given design and not
just by its interface style.
Approach: The Crew System
The introduction of the concept of artificial
intelligence to work with the human requires that
we begin to think, not in terms of a human
operating a machine as we have in the past, but in
terms of communication between intelligent agents.
The problem of designing a system that produces a
symbiotic integration of the powers of the human
brain and computers is incredibly complex and
difficult. It is not simply a question of the proper
allocation of functions between man and machine,
nor should the human and the machines be
considered in competition for duties. Rather it is
essential that the human and the machine are
explicitly considered as parts of a larger
functioning system. The human may no longer be
the sole supplier, as in the past, of the initiative, the
direction, the integration, and the standards. For
instance, it may be that the safest and most efficient
system will be one that incorporates considerable
duplication or interchangeability of functions
among its human and non-human crew members
and thus benefits from the strengths of both. A
joint cognitive system implies a productive
relationship between the knowledge of the machine
and that of the human in which the different points
of view are integrated in the decision process.
In a previous paper, one of us used the term "crew
system" to describe all active, intelligent flight
participants, whether human or artificial. Dr.
Malin at JSC has proposed the idea of making
humans and computers "team players". The
implication of these terms is that the human(s) and
the machine(s) must be considered as forming a
_parmership, sharing all the responsibilities and
authorities in a concept of cooperation rather than
one of human or machine control. The close
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coupling of humans and machines requires us to
view their interactions as a total system design
problem; i.e., a crew that is composed of both
human and non-human intelligence.
One requirement of this integrated-design concept
is for training and support to help humans cope
with the new electronic environment. A second,
and more pressing requirement, is to learn to design
machine components for compatibility with real
human behavior and with full recognition that
human beings experience fluctuating motivation
and attention and also make errors.
System design geared to blending human and
automated systems must take into account all levels
of human activity from the most basic perceptual
response, through man-machine interface, and up
to and including full integration irtto the relevant
environment. For a human to perform a particular
task, he must be able to translate his psychological
representations of the system state, his goals, and
his intentions into physical actions. To interpret
the outcome of his actions, the human must be able
to perceive the resulting system state and relate
those perceptions to his psychological
representations. We must understand how people
recognize patterns, integrate information, add their
own previous knowledge and value structure and
come up with intelligent, appropriate decisions
under difficult circumstances. A problem will ensue
if the non-human intelligence negatively
interferes with any part of this fundamental
process (Norman 1987).
The need for considering design from the aspect of a
crew system also introduces concerns related to
small group and organizational science. We need to
expand our view of system requirements to include
information processing and motivation of multiple
agents in organizations. When we introduce a non-
human intelligence into the crew, the entire
interactional structure of the crew changes. At
these higher levels of integration, the results of
NASA's extensive research in group dynamics
pertaining to flight crews of long-haul civil air
transports are particularly relevant. For example,
in human groups it has been found that junior
members are often reluctant to question the actions
of the senior member even in critical situations.
Similarly, automated systems that are perceived as
highly reliable or having a high level of authority
have produced an unwillingness on the part of the
human to question and override. The quality of
interpersonal interactions and coordination among
the members of a crew in terms of their behavior
and communications has been shown to be a
fundamental factor in the performance of that crew
and its susceptibility to errors. For human crews,
this problem is a matter of selection, training, and
organizational management; for the non-human
member, it is a matter of design; for the entire
system, all these factors, along with integrating
procedures, must be included.
As yet, the human factors community has been
unable to consolidate its empirical data into design
methods and principles to guide the design process.
The demands for performance-enhancing
human/automation systems exceed our present
understanding of the science. There are too many
uncertainties in what principles are relevant to
what tasks; empirical emphasis tends to be placed
upon isolated properties of individual processes; and
even well-established phenomena developed in
laboratory settings often have very different levels
of influence when imbedded in more complex tasks.
Since comprehensive design guidelines have been
unavailable, system developers have attempted to
assess the qualities of systems composed of AI and
human components in a post facto manner.
Thusfar, the index of acceptability has tended to be
that the AI system has reached operational status.
This is an unacceptable validation procedure and
begs the question of total system capability. New
indices of quality and acceptability are needed and
even basis assumptions should to be re-examined.
In considering what might happen in combining
human intelligence and artificial intelligence, one
might postulate four major outcomes: (1)
performance (in terms of effectiveness, efficiency,
cost, etc.) is equal to that of the human crew alone;
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(2) performance is equal to that of the automated
system; (3) performance is less than that of the
human crew or of the automated system alone, and
(4) performance is better than either system alone.
In general, only the fourth outcome (improved
system performance) justifies the investment
required for combined systems. The task then
becomes finding practical methods and appropriate
metrics for assessing the level of performance and
the facility with which the human and the machine
cooperate to solve unexpected problems. This task
represents a substantial challenge to both the AI
and the human factors communities.
A paper presently in preparation by one of the
authors (Connors and Harrison, 1990) outlines
research issues that are likely to be important in
combining human and non-human intelligence. As
this paper points out, one way to begin to
understand the possibilities of integrated systems is
to fully understand the failures that occur in
present systems. A useful approach is to analyze the
specifics of how human error changes (if at all) in
the presence of automated systems. It is not enough,
however, to examine error events in terms of
number, severity, point in the mission, and the like.
Critical information may be lost if one fails to
examine error (or other measurable change) in
terms of the human functions impacted (i.e.,
perception, recognition, attention, memory,
information processing, coordination, and the like.)
All opportunities, whether in simulation, field
studies, or actual operations need to be utilized to
begin to appreciate the dynamics of human
behavior in human/automated settings.
Cumulatively, this experience base could help focus
future research and, eventually, to establish
selection, training, procedural and design criteria.
Conclusion
Currently, systems are being planned based on
exceedingly generous estimates of the human's
capabilities for processing information and of the
artificial intelligence capabilities for making sound
decisions that are accepted by the human. In other
words, we are busy building solutions when we do
not yet fully understand the problem.
Without an understanding of how to combine
human and non-human intelligence effectively, we
shall be unable to implement rational designs for
our future space systems. The issues we have raised
here, and others, need to be examined when
considering the potential of these systems. The need
for an effective marriage of human and non-human
intelligence will increase greatly with the advent of
Space Station Freedom and with the subsequent,
more distant, missions. Life in these space vehicles
is likely to mimic life in other isolated and confined
settings, i.e., marked by fatigue, moodiness,
disturbed sleep, sensory deprivation, reduced
motivation, and loneliness (Connors, Harrison and
Akins, 1985; Harrison and Connors, 1984). All of
these will tend to exacerbate the physical problems
that the space crews will endure. Yet, the crew must
not only survive, but display a high level of
productivity. In the longer-durations space
missions of the future, the use of automation and the
discharge of responsibilities by human and non-
human crewmembers will be essential to the
conduct of the mission as well as to the health and
welfare of the crew.
While we stress, as we do here, the problem of data
and activity overload, we should keep in mind that,
during some phases of long-duration spaceflight,
the opposite problem may occur. Boredom during
long and uneventful phases of flight could lead to
loss of productivity and it may be necessary to
design into these system a level of crew workload
that is not only sufficiently restricted to be
manageable, but also sufficiently large and
engaging to offset boredom and ennui (Statler and
Billings, 1989).
One day, some believe, the intelligence of a
computer may rival that of the human brain. One
day, we may learn how to couple human brains and
computing machines in new and productive
partnerships. For now, however, we must rely
predominantly on human intelligence, judgement,
flexibility, creativity and imagination in dealing
with unexpected events; while relying heavily on
machine intelligence for the logic, speed,
persistence, consistency and exactitude it possesses.
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Our task for the near future is to begin the process
of building towards symbiosis and improved system
performance, avoiding on the way, the pitfalls that
could lead to precipitous system failure.
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